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INTRODUCTION
Public entities increasingly maintain that the First Amendment
permits them to ensure that private speakers' views are not mistakenly
attributed to the government. Consider, for example, Virginia's efforts
to ban the Sons of Confederate Veterans' display of the Confederate flag
logo on state-sponsored specialty license plates. Seeking to remain
neutral in the ongoing debate over whether the Confederate flag is a
symbol of "hate" or "heritage,"' Virginia argued that the state would be
wrongly perceived as endorsing the flag if the logo appeared on a state-
issued plate adorned by the identifier "VIRGINIA." 2 The Fourth Circuit
was unpersuaded, holding that the logo's exclusion violated the First
Amendment.
3
Such clashes between public and private entities' expressive claims
raise a series of interesting questions. Do governmental entities have a
legitimate interest in ensuring that they are not mistakenly understood
as endorsing or delivering what are actually the views of private
speakers? If so, what actions does the First Amendment permit them to
take to protect that interest?4 As disputes involving these questions rise
in number," courts increasingly search for guidance.
See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r, Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 305
F.3d 241, 242 (4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc)
(describing debate over symbolic meaning of Confederate flag); Erickson v. City of Topeka,
209 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1140 (D. Kan. 2002) (same).
2 Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r, Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d
610, 615-16 (4th Cir. 2002).
3 See id.
Note that asserting that the First Amendment permits government to control its own
expression is not the same as arguing that government has its own First Amendment
"right" to free speech. For a thoughtful discussion, and ultimately rejection, of the notion
of government as a First Amendment "rightholder," see Randall P. Bezanson & William G.
Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1377, 1501-08 (2001).
' See id. at 1381 ("[Tlhe use of speech by government is expanding and taking new
forms...."); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1221-22,
1262 (1984) (predicting accurately that "government attempts to regulate access to certain
channels of communication on the basis of content are likely to recur with greater
frequency in the years ahead"); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who's Talking? Disentangling
Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35, 35 (2002) ("[Ilncreasingly,
through various different types of interactions, government and private groups or
individuals are speaking together."); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv.
565, 569-70 (1980) (discussing emerging issues involving government speech).
6 See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 288 F.3d at 618 ("No clear standard has yet
been enunciated in our circuit or the Supreme Court for determining when the government
is 'speaking' and thus able to draw viewpoint-based distinctions, and when it is regulating
private speech and thus unable to do so."), en banc reh'g denied 305 F.3d 241, 245 (2002)
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Several recent cases illustrate courts' difficulties in distinguishing the
government's constitutionally suspect regulation of private expression
from its permissible efforts to protect its own speech from private
appropriation. On one hand, the Eighth Circuit in 2000 held that the
University of Missouri's public radio station did not violate the First
Amendment when it refused to accept - and thus acknowledge on-air
- financial support from the Ku Klux Klan.7 Just a few months later,
however, a different panel from the same circuit held that Missouri's
Highway and Transportation Commission ran afoul of the First
Amendment when it rejected the Klan's application to participate in a
roadside clean-up program that would require its recognition on a state
highway sign.8 In both cases, Missouri argued that it legitimately sought
to ensure that the Klan's views were not erroneously attributed to the
state, while the Klan maintained that its exclusion violated the First
Amendment.9
Inconsistent outcomes are often driven by hard cases. These particular
cases are challenging because they present elements of both
governmental and private speech when a court's decision to characterize
speech as governmental or private triggers very different, often outcome-
determinative tests. Under prevailing doctrine, government's
viewpoint-based regulation of private speech is constitutionally suspect,
while government is largely free to determine which views it will itself
10
express.
But sometimes speech may most accurately be described as
simultaneously belonging both to government and to private individuals
or groups. This is often the case when a public actor offers private
(Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc) (characterizing government speech
doctrine as "still in its formative stages, and, as yet, it is neither extensively nor finely
developed."); id. at 252 (Gregory, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("'Speech
by attribution,' a largely unexplored concept of First Amendment jurisprudence,
demonstrates the tricky interplay and relationship between the concepts of private and
government speech."); Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir.
2001) ("The Supreme Court has provided very little guidance as to what constitutes
government speech."), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 997 (2001).
' Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 814 (2000).
' Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 903 (2001).
9 Other cases implicating both governmental and private expression have generated
similarly split results. For example, in 2001, the Eighth Circuit held unconstitutional
Missouri's refusal to issue a personalized license plate with the message "ARYAN-i,"
while the Second Circuit found no constitutional infirmity in Vermont's rejection of a
"SHTHPNS" plate. Compare Lewis v. Wilson, 253 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535
U.S. 986 (2002), with Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001).
"0 See infra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
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speakers an expressive opportunity that is especially attractive because it
appears to carry some indication of government endorsement or
imprimatur." Recognizing that public and private entities sometimes
speak jointly may help us sort through some of these hard cases.
Part I of this Article argues that government has a significant interest
in protecting the integrity of its own expression - i.e., in ensuring that
its own views and messages are not distorted by others. Although
government remains politically accountable for its speech, I assert that it
should be held responsible only for its own views, and not those of
others mistakenly attributed to it.
Part II then describes the very different standards applied by the
Supreme Court when evaluating government's efforts to express itself,
as opposed to government's regulation of private speakers. I go on to
suggest that courts have too often felt compelled to choose between these
two apparently mutually exclusive categories, rather than
acknowledging that some cases may implicate expression by both public
and private entities simultaneously.
I seek in Part III to identify the factors that help us determine whether
speech is understood as partly or fully the government's own speech and
thus sufficiently attributable to the government to trigger its own
expressive interest. These measures include the identity of the literal
speaker, the purposes that both government and private participants
seek to achieve, the availability of alternative vehicles for private
expression, and the effectiveness of government disclaimers. Examining
these factors helps us determine whether government is motivated by a
sincere interest in its own expressive integrity and whether it reasonably
fears that - absent preventive action - it will be misunderstood as
uttering and endorsing what are really the opinions of others.
Finally, in Part IV, I apply these factors to some challenging cases,
concluding that government should have considerable latitude to protect
what is truly its own speech from being appropriated by others.
I. GOVERNMENT'S ExPREssIVE INTERESTS AND THEIR VALUE
Government may make affirmative or negative expressive choices. By
"affirmative" expressive interests, I refer to a governmental entity's
deliberate decision to promote a specific message, such as New
Hampshire's "Live Free or Die" or the District of Columbia's "Taxation
Without Representation" license plates. Public entities may also exercise
" See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
1320 [Vol. 37:1317
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significant "negative" expressive choices in dissociating themselves from
the views of others - i.e., by preventing private speech from being
mistakenly attributed to the government.
12
A. Government's "Affirmative" Expressive Interests
Professors Bezanson and Buss offer this helpful explanation of the
value of government's affirmative speech:
Democratic governments must speak, for democracy is a two-way
affair. This is particularly true in representative democracies, where
governments' speech must consist not just of information, but also
of explanation, persuasion, and justification to a polity tethered to
the policies and preferences acted upon by its representatives....
Speech is but one means that government must have at its disposal
to conduct its affairs and to accomplish its ends. 3
As an example of a government's efforts to ensure that private
speakers do not undermine its affirmative message, consider Downs v.
Los Angeles Unified School District.14  In Downs, a school district had
established a bulletin board inviting faculty and staff submissions to
promote the district's support for Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month
celebrations. 5 A teacher brought a First Amendment challenge when the
12 See Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting
difference between school's desire to convey affirmative message from what court termed
"negative imprimatur" cases, where school seeks to avoid perception that it endorsed
speech of another); Higgins v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs. Branch, 13 P.3d 531, 550 (Or.
Ct. App. 2000) (observing that private individuals should not "be free to make the state say
whatever they choose"), affd, 335 Or. 481 (2003); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1387
("[G]overnment may want to avoid the erroneous perception that privately chosen
messages are supported by the government.").
" Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1380; see also Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is the very business of government to
favor and disfavor points of view on (in modern times, at least) innumerable subjects -
which is the main reason we have decided to elect those who run the government, rather
than save money by making their posts hereditary."); Abner S. Greene, Government of the
Good, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1, 69 (2000) ("Government speech has many virtues, and those
virtues do not disappear if the speech is on a matter of current social contest."); Jacobs,
supra note 5, at 41 ("Government at all levels must speak to function effectively."); Robert
C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34
UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1825 (1987) ("[I]t is probably not too outlandish an exaggeration to
conclude that government organizations would grind to a halt were the Court seriously to
prohibit viewpoint discrimination in the internal management of speech."); Shiffrin, supra
note 5, at 606 ("Government has legitimate interests in informing, in educating, and in
persuading.").
14 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 994 (2001).
5 Id. at 1005.
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school refused to allow him to post materials questioning
homosexuality's morality. The school district argued that, rather than
suppressing private dissent, it sought only to safeguard its own
celebratory expression from interlopers. The Ninth Circuit had no
trouble concluding that the bulletin board and its contents constituted
the government's own speech:
We conclude that when a public high school is the speaker, its
control of its own speech is not subject to the constraints of
constitutional safeguards and forum analysis, but instead is
measured by practical considerations applicable to any individual's
choice of how to convey oneself: among other things, content,
timing, and purpose. Simply because the government opens its
mouth to speak does not give every outside individual or group a
First Amendment right to play ventriloquist. As applied here, the
First Amendment allows ... [the school district] to decide that
Downs may not speak as its representative. This power is certainly
so if his message is one with which the district disagrees. 17
Similarly, in Griffin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, the Fourth Circuit
found that the First Amendment posed no bar to the federal Veterans
Administration's (VA's) rejection of what it characterized as private
efforts to undermine its affirmative message.18 Citing its choice to honor
those killed in the Civil War and buried in federal cemeteries as
Americans, rather than as Confederates, the VA denied plaintiffs'
request that the Confederate flag be flown over Point Lookout
Confederate Cemetery. The Fourth Circuit held that "[riequiring the VA
to allow the Confederate flag to fly daily over Point Lookout certainly
'garbles [and] distorts' the VA's chosen message that 'Point Lookout
does not commemorate fallen Confederates as such[, but rather,] ... pays
tribute to them as citizens of the United States who died in service of the
Confederacy during a national conflict. '" 19 The court further explained
that because the VA is free to determine its own message, it should be
allowed to take action to protect the integrity of that message.
2
0
Of course, different governmental entities hold and express a wide
range of views. While Griffin upheld a federal agency's exclusion of the
Confederate flag as inimical to its affirmative message, the state of
1" See id. at 1011-16.
" Id. at 1013.
274 F.3d 818 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 947 (2002).
19 Id. at 822 (emphasis added by Fourth Circuit) (quoting Appellant's Reply Br. at 7).
20 See id. at 824.
1322 [Vol. 37:1317
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Alabama successfully embraced the same flag as its own expression in
NAACP v. Hunt.21  Denying private plaintiffs' First Amendment
challenge to the state's display of the Confederate flag over the capitol
dome, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Alabama was free to use the
dome for its own communicative purposes. Identifying political
accountability as the appropriate means for policing governmental
speech, the court advised that the remedy for those in disagreement with
the state's chosen message "lies within the democratic processes of the
State of Alabama and the voting rights of all its citizens .... 
"22
B. Government's "Negative" (or "Dissociative") Expressive Interests
Government's negative expressive interests can be described as the flip
side of the proposition that the First Amendment prohibits a government
from compelling an individual to utter - or otherwise display or
publicly associate with - a viewpoint with which he or she disagrees.
Recall Wooley v. Maynard, where the Supreme Court held that New
Hampshire's affirmative interest in expressing itself through a license
plate featuring the state's "Live Free or Die" motto "cannot outweigh an
individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for
such a message."23 The Court characterized New Hampshire's actions as
forcing individuals to choose between using their private property as a
"mobile billboard for the State's ideological message or suffer[ing] a
penalty."24 The Court concluded that the First Amendment does not
permit the government to "require an individual to participate in the
dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private
property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and
read by the public." 2s
Conversely, courts have recognized that government may similarly
have significant "negative" interests in "avoid[ing] becoming the, - .. .
courier, 6 for views that are not its own. In certain educational contexts,
for example, courts have held that First Amendment values are not
frustrated by a public school's efforts to dissociate itself from private
1 891 F.2d 1555 (1lth Cir. 1990).
' Id. at 1566.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that government-compelled
inclusion of gay and lesbian groups in parade violated First Amendment because groups'
views might be erroneously attributed to parade organizers).
14 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
Id. at 713.
26 See id. at 717.
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speech that it reasonably fears will be mistakenly attributed to it and
thus undermine its pedagogical goals.27
Consider Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,5 where the Supreme
Court upheld a public school's refusal to publish articles in its
newspaper discussing student experiences with birth control, pregnancy,
and divorce. 29 Emphasizing educators' authority over school-sponsored
publications "and other expressive activities that students, parents, and
the members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school," 30 the Court concluded that the school's action
was justified, inter alia, by its interest in ensuring that "the views of
individual speakers are not erroneously attributed to the school."
31
Courts have acknowledged the strength of government's dissociative
32expressive interests in other situations as well. The Second Circuit, for
27 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817,
827 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding school district's exclusion of family planning organization's
advertisements from high school newspapers and other publications and recognizing
school's interest in, inter alia, "disassociating itself from speech inconsistent with its
educational mission and avoiding the appearance of endorsing views, no matter who the
speaker is.").
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Id. at 263.
Id. at 270-71.
3, Id. at 271. Even in dissent, Justice Brennan recognized the legitimacy of this interest:
"[Tihe majority is certainly correct that indicia of school sponsorship increase the
likelihood of such attribution [i.e., that the views of the individual speaker might be
erroneously attributed to the school], and that state educators may therefore have a
legitimate interest in dissociating themselves from student speech." Id. at 288-89 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). He went on, however, to characterize as excessive the school's actions in
protecting that interest: "Dissociative means [e.g., disclaimers or direct rebuttals] short of
censorship are available to the school." Id. at 289. For a different view of how schools
might permissibly protect themselves from mistaken attribution, see LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 812 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that public schools "can be
powerful means of indoctrination. To reduce the potential for abuse, some diversity of
viewpoints must be ensured, not by limiting the spectrum of views that the school system
may communicate, and not by prescribing official requirements of artificially 'balanced'
coverage of such topics as evolution and creationism, but by providing genuine
opportunities for more speech - by safeguarding the academic freedom of students and
teachers, and by affirming the constitutionally-protected status of private schools."). For
further discussion of disclaimers and their limits, see infra notes 91-92 and accompanying
text.
32 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 813 (1985)
(holding that federal government did not violate First Amendment when it limited
participation in Combined Federal Campaign "to avoid the appearance of political
favoritism without regard to the viewpoint of the excluded groups"); Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (suggesting in dictum that city's exclusion of




example, recognized government's interest in protecting itself from
mistaken attribution in General Media Communications, Inc. v. Cohen. The
court upheld a federal ban on the sale or rental of sexually explicit
materials by military personnel in their official capacity (e.g., in military
exchanges), noting the statutory purpose as "avoid[ing] the appearance
that the military, by selling sexually explicit materials in military
exchanges, endorses these materials." The court emphasized that the
statute intended to dissociate the military from, rather than suppress,
sexually explicit speech.
The Second Circuit reiterated the significance of this distinction more
recently in Perry v. McDonald.6 In Perry, the court upheld Vermont's
refusal to issue a "SHTHPNS" personalized license plate because the
government intended "not to suppress but to dissociate" itself from the
plate's language. The court reasoned that "inevitably [license plates] will
be associated with the state that issues them" because they are
governmental property designed to accomplish governmental goals.37
Dissenting from a deeply fractured decision to deny an en banc
hearing in Sons of Confederate Veterans, two members of the Fourth
Circuit similarly voiced support for government's dissociative interests.9
As Judge Niemeyer wrote in defense of Virginia's decision to deny the
appearance of the Confederate flag logo on state specialty license plates:
The State, however, has not taken a position on this controversial
symbol; rather it has removed itself from the fray, simply refusing to
authorize the Confederate Flag logo on license plates issued by it.
In doing so, of course, Virginia has not prohibited any citizen from
displaying the Confederate Flag logo on his or her vehicle. Rather,
the state has only indicated that the Confederate Flag logo should
not be included on a license plate issued and owned by the state and
bearing the name 'VIRGINIA' on the top.39
Judge Gregory echoed these concerns: "I would have hoped, if rehearing
were granted, that we would consider the government's interest in
avoiding 'speech by attribution;' that is, the government's right not to be
3 131 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 951 (1998).
' Id. at 276.
31 See id. at 281 n.1O.
- 280 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001).
3 Id. at 169, 170.
305 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2002).
19 Id. at 249.
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compelled to speak by private citizens." 4°
To be sure, a number of insightful commentators who acknowledge
the value of government's affirmative speech remain skeptical about the
strength of its negative expressive interests.41  But a government's
justifiable efforts to inform and persuade the public of its affirmative
views are too easily undermined if that government cannot take
dissociative action to ensure that private opinions are not erroneously
attributed to it.4 The more formidable challenge, in my opinion, is
determining whether such government actions are a pretext for
censoring private speech or are instead spurred by a sincere and
reasonable concern that others' speech will be mistakenly understood as
the government's own.
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHARACTERIZING SPEECH AS PRIVATE OR
GOVERNMENTAL
The First Amendment standards for evaluating government's efforts
to express itself differ dramatically from those that apply to
government's regulation of private speech. In short, when government
speaks on its own behalf, it is free to adopt and deliver whatever
message it chooses. On the other hand, government may not favor or
exclude private speakers based on the viewpoint - and often the
content - of their communication.
When government regulates private speech, attention to First
Amendment values requires vigilance to ensure that government is not
Id. at 252.
See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1384 (urging that government speech be
defined to include only "purposeful action by the government, expressing its own distinct
message, which is understood by those who receive it to be the government's message");
Jacobs, supra note 5, at 66-68 (2002) (recognizing government's affirmative expressive
interests, but expressing doubt as to strength of any negative or dissociative interest).
' Professors Bezanson and Buss emphasize the difficulty of ascertaining "reasonable
audience interpretations" for these purposes: "Attribution, in short, is a difficult, subtle,
fact-intensive, and circumstance-specific question." See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at
1482. But in other contexts, the law has long accorded great significance to the perceptions
and behavior of reasonable individuals. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,20-
21 (1993) (adopting standard for evaluating Title VII hostile work environment claims that
assesses whether reasonable person would find harassment severe or pervasive); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (holding that person is "seized" for Fourth
Amendment purposes when reasonable person in same situation would have believed that
he was not free to leave); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1988) ("A person is
justified in using force against an aggressor when.., he or she reasonably believes such
force to be necessary.").
1326 [Vol. 37:1317
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seeking to suppress unpopular or inconvenient messages. 43 Key to this
inquiry is a commitment to evenhandedness, to uncovering and rejecting
government attempts to suppress speech based on content or
viewpoint." Bedrock First Amendment doctrine thus makes clear that
government may not regulate communication simply because the
government - or the public - finds the speech objectionable. 45 For this
reason, government's content-based restrictions on fully protected
speech face strict scrutiny.4"
Government's ability to regulate private speech is similarly
47constrained when government creates a forum for private expression.
The Supreme Court's public forum doctrine is relatively easy to recite,
albeit often hard to apply." Courts first assess what type of forum has
" See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413, 516 (1996) ("[Mlost of First Amendment
doctrine constitutes a highly, but necessarily, complex scheme for ascertaining the
governmental purposes underlying regulations of speech.").
" NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1990) ("[Tlhe government may
not abridge 'equality of status in the field of ideas' by granting the use of public forums to
those whose views it finds acceptable while denying their use to those with controversial
views.") (quoting Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
45 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (stating that First Amendment
does not permit state to prohibit flag-burning, even though such expressive conduct is
offensive to many); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (finding that
offensiveness is "classically not [a justification] validating the suppression of expression
protected by the First Amendment"); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
("But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("[T]he State has no right to cleanse public debate to the
point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us.").
See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
" As discussed infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text, government may engage in
neither content-based nor viewpoint-based regulation of private speech in traditional or
designated public fora, but is free to engage in content-based - but not viewpoint-based -
discrimination while regulating private speech in nonpublic fora. As many have observed,
however, the distinction, if any, between content-based and viewpoint-based
discrimination is slippery. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (noting that distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination
"is not a precise one"); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r, Va. Dep't of Motor
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 624 n.11 (4th Cir. 2002) ("As the Ninth Circuit has noted, the
'coherence' of the distinction between 'content discrimination' and 'viewpoint
discrimination' may be seen as 'tenuous."') (citations omitted); Martin v. Vt. Dep't of Motor
Vehicles, 819 A.2d 742, 749 (Vt. 2003) (noting that "law on viewpoint neutrality is not a
model of clarity"); Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112
HARV. L. REv. 84, 105 (1998) ("[It is hardly clear that the line between viewpoint and other
forms of content discrimination can be sustained, except possibly in extreme cases.").
" The Court's public forum doctrine remains the topic of extensive criticism. See Post,
supra note 13, at 1715 n.7 ("In a world of disputatious academic criticism, the unrelenting
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been created, and then determine whether the government regulation
can withstand the appropriate test. Speakers may be blocked from
traditional or designated public fora only when their exclusion is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.49
Government may limit or deny access to a nonpublic forum only if its
restrictions are reasonable and do not target speakers on the basis of
their viewpoints. 0
The rules are completely different when government itself is speaking,
as the Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed. The Court emphasized
this distinction, for example, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
University of Virginia:"
[W]hen the government disburses public funds to private entities to
convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor
distorted by the grantee.... It does not follow, however,... that
viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University does
not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but
instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers. A holding that the University may not
discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose
speech it facilitates does not restrict the University's own speech,
which is controlled by different principles. 2
The Court stressed the First Amendment significance of the difference
between governmental and private speech yet again in Board of Regents v.
Southworth:
The University having disclaimed that the speech is its own, we do
not reach the question whether traditional political controls to
ensure responsible government action would be sufficient to
and unanimous condemnation of contemporary public forum doctrine is truly
remarkable."); see also TRIBE, supra note 31, at 987 (noting public forum doctrine has
"proven to be quite manipulable and problematic"); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1381
(stating that public forum analysis is "so riven with incoherence and fine distinctions that it
is on the verge of collapse"); Farber & Nowak, supra note 5, at 1234 ("Classification of
public places as various types of forums has only confused judicial opinions by diverting
attention from the real first amendment issues involved in the cases"); Suzanne Stone
Montgomery, Note, When the Klan Adopts-A-Highway: The Weakness of the Public Forum
Doctrine Exposed, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 557, 558 (1999) ("The public forum doctrine has proved
unworkable in practice.").
" See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
so See id.
515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995).
52 Id. at 834-35.
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overcome First Amendment objections and to allow the challenged
program under the principle that the government can speak for
itself.... Our decision ought not to be taken to imply that in other
instances, the University, its agents or employees, or - of particular
importance - its faculty, are subject to the First Amendment
analysis which controls in this case. Where the University speaks,
either in its own name through its regents or officers, or in myriad
other ways through its diverse faculties, the analysis likely would be
altogether different. The Court has not held, or suggested, that
when the government speaks the rules we have discussed come into
play. 3
In short, characterizing the speech as governmental or private drives the
decision of which test to apply, and thus often the litigation's outcome.5
4
Determining whether certain expression belongs to the government or
to private speakers, however, can be tricky - so tough, in fact, that
courts wrestling with these questions have generated inconsistent and
often unsatisfying opinions. When confronted with the stark choice
between characterizing speech as governmental or private, courts have
56too often responded by forcing the expression into one box or another.
529 U.S. 217, 229, 234-35 (2000) (citations omitted).
' See also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 534, 541 (2001) (holding that
Congress violated First Amendment when it banned Legal Services Corporation (LSC)
funding recipients from challenging existing welfare law and characterizing LSC program
"as designed to facilitate private speech" rather than as government's own expression that
would trigger very different and more lenient rules).
' See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r, Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles,
288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002) ("No clear standard has yet been enunciated in our circuit
or by the Supreme Court for determining when the government is 'speaking' and thus able
to draw viewpoint-based distinctions, and when it is regulating private speech and thus
unable to do so."), en banc reh'g denied, 305 F.3d 241, 245 (2002) (Luttig, J., respecting denial
of rehearing en banc) (characterizing government speech doctrine as "still in its formative
stages, and, as yet, it is neither extensively nor finely developed"); id. at 252 (Gregory, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("'Speech by attribution,' a largely unexplored
concept of First Amendment jurisprudence, demonstrates the tricky interplay and
relationship between the concepts of private and government speech."); Wells v. City &
County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001) ("The Supreme Court has provided
very little guidance as to what constitutes government speech."), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 997
(2001).
' See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 305 F.3d at 244-45 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of en
banc review) (observing that courts have "assumed, in oversimplification, that all speech
must be either that of a private individual or that of the government, and that a speech
event cannot be both private and governmental at the same time"); Bezanson & Buss, supra
note 4, at 1381, 1430 (noting that despite supposed doctrinal "chasm" between them, "the
chambers of government speech and the public forum are not watertight,... [nor]
mutually exclusive.").
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Sometimes courts "resolve" the problem by simply ignoring one
party's expressive interests altogether. For example, a number of courts
have allowed government to regulate personalized license plate
messages while denying altogether the plates' significant opportunities
for drivers' personal expression.5 7 Perhaps because they feel compelled
to make a choice, these courts make their selection "easier" by refusing
to acknowledge that any private expressive interest is involved 5
Just as commonly, courts fail to consider the possibility that
government expression may also be at stake. This omission may at times
be attributable to a government litigant's failure to raise its own
expressive interests as a defense 9 (which, of course, may signal that
government instead impermissibly sought to suppress others' speech).
For example, Missouri apparently did not assert (and the Eighth Circuit
thus did not consider) the state's own expressive interest in defending its
rejection of an application for an "ARYAN-I" license plate.60 Instead, the
" California state courts, for example, have consistently denied that personalized
license plates provide any significant vehicle for private expression. See Kahn v. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 16 Cal. App. 4th 159, 166-67 (1993) (upholding state rejection of "TPUBG"
plate, which in stenographic symbols can be read either as "IF YOU CAN" or "FUCK," and
stating "[tihat the state permits license holders, for an additional fee, to vary minimally
their vehicle identification from the prescribed form by selecting letter and/or number
combinations which may reflect" personal identity or expressive interests does not trigger
First Amendment rights; little expression is possible "within the limited confines of the
[plate's] seven alphabetical and numerical symbols"); Katz v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 108
Cal. Rptr. 424, 427 (Ct. App. 1973) (upholding government rejection of proposed "EZLAY"
personalized plate because State's regulation is "[alt best a minimal and incidental
restriction on Katz' alleged First Amendment freedom of expression;" First Amendment
considerations are at best minimal, if present at all).
As discussed infra notes 97-109 and accompanying text, I agree with the California
courts' conclusion that government may regulate license plates' content, but not the courts'
analysis. Instead of denying private speakers' expressive interests altogether, I believe that
government should not be compelled to act as the "ventriloquist's dummy" through which
those views are aired.
See Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 711 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 532 U.S. 903 (2001)
(noting that "the State admitted repeatedly in depositions that it does not view the erection
of an Adopt-a-Highway sign as an endorsement or promotion of the adopter," court found
no government expressive interest asserted and decided case under unconstitutional
conditions doctrine); Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1101-
02 (D. Md. 1997) (noting that state conceded that Sons of Confederate Veterans' use of
Confederate flag logo on their specialty plate design constituted private expression, court
found that state's ban on logo in response to citizen complaints violated First Amendment).
But see Recent Cases, Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Viewpoint Discrimination -
Eighth Circuit Holds that Missouri May Not Exclude Knights of the Ku Klux Klan from Public
Program, 114 HARV. L. REv. 660, 665 (2000) (characterizing Cuffley panel as "ben[ding] over
backward to ignore the relevant government speech interest").
' See Lewis v. Wilson, 253 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing personalized
license plates' opportunities for private, but not government, expression: "[Ilt occurs to us
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state unsuccessfully attempted to justify Missouri's law banning
personalized plates that are "obscene, profane, inflammatory, or contrary
to public policy" as "promoting highway safety by rejecting license
plates that could incite so-called road rage. 6 1 Such government efforts
to justify regulation of private speech because it offends or upsets its
viewers are generally doomed to constitutional failure.62
The handful of courts that have acknowledged even the possibility of
joint or simultaneous government/private speech have offered little
guidance on the standards for evaluating government action in this
context.63  Even those courts that acknowledge the legitimacy of
government's interest in protecting its own expressive integrity too often
muddy the waters by claiming to apply some sort of forum doctrine.
Recall, for example, Griffin v. Department of Veterans Affairs64 In Griffin,
the Fourth Circuit held that "[riequiring the VA to allow the Confederate
flag to fly daily over Point Lookout certainly 'garbles [and] distorts' the
VA's chosen message."65 Purporting to ground its conclusions in forum
analysis, the court characterized the VA program at issue as a nonpublic
forum, in which government is free to regulate private speech so long as
its actions are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. 66  Yet an honest
assessment of the facts would acknowledge that the VA's decision to fly
the American, and not the Confederate, flag over a Civil War cemetery is
actually viewpoint-based, rather than viewpoint-neutral. Forum
that a personalized plate is not so very different from a bumper sticker that expresses a
social or political message. The evident purpose... is to give vent to the personality, and
to reveal the character or views, of the plate's holders."), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2001).
61 Id. at 1078, 1080.
62 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 377-78 (1992) (striking down city ordinance that banned display of symbols that
cause anger, resentment, or alarm on basis of race, religion, or gender as impermissible
viewpoint-based discrimination); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r, Va. Dep't
of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 616 n.4 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[Vliewpoint-based restrictions of
private speech are presumptively unconstitutional.").
Judge Luttig, for example, suggests that if speech is both private and governmental,
then "at a minimum therefore the government may not engage in viewpoint
discrimination." Sons of Confederate Veterans, 305 F.3d at 247 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of
en banc review). He notes, however, that a different result may be possible in situations
where government speech interests are great or where government is merely engaging in
content-based discrimination. Id.; see also Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132,
1154-55 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (arguing that holiday display constituted both private and
governmental speech, but failing to identify constitutional analysis triggered by such joint
speech).
274 F.3d 818 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 947 (2002).
Id. at 899.
See id. at 820-25 (characterizing Virginia's refusal to fly Confederate flag as
"viewpoint-neutral" regulation of nonpublic forum).
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analysis, properly applied, would have led the court to strike down the
VA's actions. Similarly, many state laws regulating personalized license
plates would likely be found unconstitutional under forum analysis
because they include what may well be viewpoint-based restrictions.
The better framework is to understand these not as forum cases, but
situations in which government itself is speaking - either on its own or
jointly with a private speaker - and is thus free to protect the integrity
of its own expression by refusing to utter speech with which it disagrees.
Indeed, government's own expressive interest offers the only
constitutional rationale for its regulation of many messages on
personalized and specialty license plates, when clearly government could
not regulate similar words and symbols on purely private bumper
stickers, license plate frames, billboards, T-shirts, or jackets. 
6
For these reasons, we should think more carefully about the
circumstances under which private speech may be mistakenly
understood as that of the government. The next Part identifies some
factors that may be helpful in determining whether speech is sufficiently
attributable to the government to trigger the government's own
expressive interests.
III. WHEN AND How MAY GOVERNMENT PROTECT ITS OWN EXPRESSION?
SOME FACTORS TO CONSIDER
Our commitment to the First Amendment and its prohibition on
government censorship 69  requires that we distinguish between
government's impermissible attempts to manipulate unpopular private
speech and its legitimate efforts to protect its own expressive integrity.
The following government justifications, if sincere, should thus trigger
67 See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 170.00(c)(7)(D) (West 2004) ("The department
shall refuse any configuration that may carry connotations offensive to good taste and
decency, or which would be misleading, based on criteria which includes... (2) The
configuration is a vulgar term; a term of contempt, prejudice, or hostility; an insulting or
degrading term; a racially degrading term; or an ethnically degrading term... (4) The
configuration has a negative connotation to a specific group."); IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 761-
401.6(321)(2)(d) (West 2004) (Department of Transportation will not issue personalized
plates that contain any combination of characters "which is... defined in dictionaries as a
term of vulgarity, contempt, prejudice, hostility, insult, or racial or ethnic degradation.").
I See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377-78 (1992) (striking down city
ordinance that banned display of symbols that cause anger, resentment, or alarm on basis
of race, religion, or gender as impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (holding that First Amendment does not permit
government to ban wearing of jacket emblazoned with message "Fuck the Draft").
69 See, e.g., Farber & Novak, supra note 5, at 1235 ("The core command of the [F]irst
[A]mendment is a prohibition on censorship.").
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quite different constitutional analyses: "We denied the Klan's
application because we hate the Klan and what it stands for" is
constitutionally suspect, while "We denied the Klan's application
because we too are speaking in this context and we reasonably feared
that the Klan's speech would be wrongly attributed to us" should better
withstand a First Amendment attack.
The challenge, then, is determining whether government actions are a
pretext for suppressing private speech or are instead spurred by a
sincere and reasonable concern that others' speech will be mistakenly
understood as the government's own. To allay our suspicions of
censorship, a governmental entity seeking to justify actions taken to
protect its expressive interests should demonstrate that the government
is literally speaking in a given context and that, absent these preventive
actions, reasonable onlookers would mistakenly perceive the
government to be delivering or endorsing what are really the views of
others. This test protects government's own expressive interests without
thwarting First Amendment values. The following inquiries can be
particularly helpful in assessing whether government can meet this
standard. 70
70 A few courts have recently begun to articulate and apply a four-factor test when
charged with characterizing speech as private or governmental. Noting that the Supreme
Court has provided very little guidance as to what constitutes government speech, the
Tenth, and then the Fourth, Circuits synthesized the following from earlier appellate
decisions:
Our sister circuits have examined (1) the central 'purpose' of the program in
which the speech in question occurs; (2) the degree of 'editorial control' exercised
by the government or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the
identity of the 'literal' speaker; and (4) whether the government or the private
entity bears the 'ultimate responsibility' for the content of the speech ....
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r, Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610,
618-19 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140-41
(10th Cir. 2001). The courts applying this test have offered no discussion of its underlying
rationale. Nevertheless, as discussed infra notes 71-93 and accompanying text, I find the
identity of the literal speaker and the program's purposes to be among the factors that are
especially helpful when assessing whether government sincerely and reasonably fears that
it will wrongly be held accountable as endorsing views that are not its own. Indeed, I find
that these two factors help explain whether the government or the private entity ultimately
bears responsibility or accountability for the speech, which these courts have identified as a
separate factor for consideration. See infra note 86. As discussed infra note 93, however, I
am skeptical that the degree of editorial control exercised by the government is a helpful
measure for our purposes.
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A. Who Is the "Literal" Speaker?
If government is compelled to utter the views of others, there is a
significantly greater likelihood that those opinions will be mistakenly
attributed to the government.
For this reason, in situations where the government is the "literal
speaker" - i.e., the entity that is actually saying, writing, or otherwise
directly delivering the message - it should be permitted to decline to
serve as the "dummy" through which a private ventriloquist projects her
71views.
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the University of Missouri offers
a particularly instructive example.72 Recall that the Eighth Circuit denied
the Klan's First Amendment challenge to a public university radio
station's rejection of proffered financial support that would have
required on-air acknowledgment. The Klan's local leader sought to
underwrite National Public Radio's All Things Considered because he
"enjoyed the program, wanted to support KMWU, and hoped to attract
more highly educated people to his organization." 73 The Klan offered to
contribute to the show's support, and submitted the following copy to be
read by on-air station personnel in acknowledgment: "The Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan, a White Christian organization, standing up for the
rights and values of White Christian America since 1865. For more
information[,] please contact .... ,74
The court held that the underwriting acknowledgments constituted
the public station's own speech and that the station was thus free to
control the content of that expression. In so holding, the court
emphasized the fact that station employees would themselves be
delivering the Klan's promotion because they read the acknowledgments
on-air.
" See Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000).
203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 814 (2000).
11 Id. at 1089.
74 Id.
' Id. at 1094. The panel also emphasized that the station was a communications
enterprise and that the acknowledgments' central purpose was "not to promote the views
of the donors, but to acknowledge" donations, pursuant to federal requirements. Id. at
1093. The court was also impressed by the station's consistent assertion of control over the
acknowledgments' content (the station had declined donations from Ultimate Fighting
Championships, the American Friends Service Committee, and an establishment "known
to be a house of ill repute"). Id. at 1089. Finally, the court noted that the station was
ultimately responsible for the broadcast's content, including its compliance with various
FCC regulations and other legal obligations. Id. at 1094 n.8.
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Underwriting acknowledgments in this way appear akin to a state's
Adopt-a-Highway program, in which the state manufactures and erects
roadside signs that, explicitly or implicitly, thank private donors or
volunteers. Although private entities that have volunteered their
efforts or offered a financial contribution may well feel that they have
bought - and thus "own" - the signs' expression, they are not the
"literal" speakers when government makes, installs, and maintains the
signs. In each of these scenarios, private input or contributions to the
government's message should not necessarily strip the government of its
ability to control that message. Indeed, the government's role as "literal"
speaker strengthens its expressive concerns.
Wells v. City and County of Denver further illustrates the role of the
literal speaker in ascribing speech to the government or to private
actors.7 Denver erected a holiday display on the steps of the City and
County Building that depicted a creche, reindeer, snowmen, Christmas
trees, Santa Claus, and elves. The display was accompanied by a large
sign with the words "Happy Holidays from the Keep the Lights
Foundation and the sponsors that help maintain the lights at the City
71
and County Building," followed by a listing of six corporate sponsors.
A private individual whose efforts to add her own sign to the display
were rebuffed by Denver challenged her exclusion on First Amendment
grounds.79 She characterized the display as a collection of private speech
and pointed to the sign's literal text, which appeared to identify private
sponsors as joining Denver in extending holiday greetings to passers-by.
Denver, for its part, claimed the display as entirely its own speech
celebrating the holiday season and thanking its financial contributors.
The Tenth Circuit panel quarreled over the identity of the literal
speaker. The majority held that the speech belonged to Denver, largely
76 See infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 997 (2001).
78 Id. at 1140 n.4. The sponsors were identified as News 4, Spirit of Colorado, Coors
Light, King Soopers - AAA of Colorado, Denver Rocky Mountain News, and Rock Bottom
Brewery. Id. at 1154 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1139-42. The plaintiff sought to post her own sign on the steps with the
following message:
At this season of THE WINTER SOLSTICE may reason prevail. There are no
gods, no devils, no angels, no heaven or hell. There is only our natural world.
THE 'CHRIST CHILD' IS A RELIGIOUS MYTH. THE CITY OF DENVER
SHOULD NOT PROMOTE RELIGION. 'I believe in an America where the
separation of church and state is absolute.' John F. Kennedy - 1960 Presidential
campaign. PRESENTED BY THE FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION.
Id. at 1137.
20041 1335
University of California, Davis [Vol. 37:1317
deferring to the city's assertion of its own expressive purpose and its
apparent control over a display that it owned, maintained, and secured.Y
The dissent argued that the display included both private and
government speech, emphasizing the literal text of the sign as
communicating a message to the public from private sponsors as well as
from Denver." As a result, the dissent maintained, onlookers would
likely perceive the display as private speech. 82
Wells' holiday display offers an excellent example of joint government
and private speech. Denver sought to offer a holiday message of its own,
while at the same time providing private entities the opportunity to
express (and receive public recognition of) their support for the city's
celebration. The private sponsors may have seen the display as
communicating their own holiday greetings to the public as well as their
commitment to philanthropy - with the added bonus of the
government's imprimatur in the form of gratitude, explicit or implicit.8
But truly joint speech requires that both parties agree to the joint
expression. Absent such agreement, either party may withhold its voice
rather than be compelled to join speech with which it does not want to
be associated. In this case, the plaintiff did not seek to join Denver's
o Id. at 1139-40.
81 Id. at 1154 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 1155.
As written, the sign's literal speakers appear to be both Denver and the private
sponsors ("Happy Holidays from the Keep the Lights Foundation and the sponsors that
help maintain the lights at the City and County Building"). Denver's argument that it
spoke alone would have been bolstered if the display's sign clearly identified Denver as the
sole and literal speaker (e.g., "A Holiday Greeting from the City of Denver. Thanks to the
following sponsors for their financial support .... ). Such a message would more closely
parallel that in Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the University of Missouri, where the
Eighth Circuit upheld the public station's claim that its decision whether to accept and
acknowledge underwriter support constituted solely government speech. Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093-95 (2000).
For a situation where the identity of the literal speaker cuts against characterizing the
speech as governmental, consider the facts in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). In Rust,
the Court upheld federal regulations that barred recipients of Title X funding from
engaging in abortion counseling or referral activities. Id. at 192-200. In so holding, the
Court found that the government had essentially contracted its speech to be uttered or
performed by health care providers receiving federal funding, and thus could require that
its funds be devoted to airing only its own viewpoint. Id. at 194. I agree, however, with
those critics who argue that in this context patients may mistakenly attribute the
government's views to their doctors. As the literal speakers in this context, the doctors
may well be misunderstood to be speaking as independent professionals offering their own
counsel, rather than as paid federal agents bound to espouse the policy preferences of the
government. See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1394-96; Robert C. Post, Subsidized
Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 172-75 (1996).
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message of thanks and celebration, but instead sought to insert her
differing views on the appropriate observance of the holiday 
season.84
Denver decided to decline to allow her to join its speech simply because
it sought to protect its message from outside appropriation.
B. Why Did Government Create the Program at Issue and Why Do Private
Speakers Seek to Participate?
Examining a program's purpose also helps assess the sincerity of a
government's assertion that its expressive integrity is imperiled by
certain private speakers' participation. Government's expressive
interests are particularly strong when it operates programs with
primarily communicative purposes - e.g., when it makes decisions about
what it will teach or broadcast. When a public entity educates, it
expresses the values it seeks to impart. When government acts as
journalist or broadcaster, it communicates what it considers newsworthy
and of general public interest. Private speakers' efforts to encroach on
those communicative choices are likely to be seen as garbling or
distorting the government's own speech. For these reasons, courts have
generally upheld these particular speakers' advertising or underwriting
choices as implicating the government's own speech. 8
But government may be literally speaking - and may be held
responsible for such speech 6 - even when its primary objective is not
necessarily communicative. In those situations, our inquiry into purpose
should explore not only why government offers a particular program,
but also why private individuals choose to participate. To what degree
do private participants seek some sort of government imprimatur for
their speech?
' The Tenth Circuit separately addressed, and rejected, the plaintiff's Establishment
Clause claims. See Wells, 257 F.3d at 1152-53.
" See Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 203 F.3d at 1093-94, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 814 (2000);
Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 827-29 (9th Cir. 1991);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-72 (1988); see also Schauer, supra note
47, at 120 (noting that some government enterprises "are themselves in the business of
supplying speech because of its content").
' Those courts adopting the four-factor analysis described supra note 70 include an
examination of whether the government or the private speaker bears "ultimate
responsibility" for the speech. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r, Va. Dep't
of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618-19 (4th Cir. 2002); Wells, 257 F.3d at 1140-41. I
understand this to ask whom listeners or onlookers will hold accountable for the speech -
the government or the private individual. In my opinion, accountability in this context is
not independently determined, but depends on the factors identified in the text: the
identity of the literal speaker, the purposes to be achieved by government and private
speakers, and the effectiveness of government disclaimers.
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Why, for example, does the Sons of Confederate Veterans (or any other
organization) desire a state-issued license plate with its name and logo,
when bumper stickers and license plate frames with the same words and
symbols are easily produced and readily available? Indeed, private
speakers have plenty of other opportunities to display the identical
message right next to, above, or below, the license plate. As one
Vermont Supreme Court justice observed, "prohibiting a term on a
vanity plate does not prevent vehicle owners from conveying the same
message through a bumper sticker affixed to their car. Bumper stickers
have historically provided Vermonters with a much more expressive
forum than vanity plates, and Vermonters have shown no reluctance to
use them to make humorous, political, and religious statements.",
7
By shunning such readily available alternatives for ventilating their
own expression, it appears that those private speakers seek the added
emphatic or symbolic value of the government's imprimatur for their
speech. As an Oregon court observed: "The reason why an individual
wants a vanity license plate is that the license plate bears the imprimatur
of the state. Petitioner wants the state's endorsement of his message ....
[A] bumper sticker would not satisfy petitioner's desire to have the state
endorse the words he chooses to display."8 In such situations,
government's interest in protecting its speech from being commandeered
by others seems especially strong.
Moreover, such government actions do not foreclose other, equally
visible, avenues for private speakers to ventilate their views.8 9  As
discussed above, when government regulates license plate messages or
" Martin v. Agency of Transp., Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 819 A.2d 742, 757 n.7 (Vt.
2003) (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also Katz v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal. App. 3d 679,
682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (noting that driver whose proposed personalized plate message is
rejected may still put combination of words and letters on car or in metal frame
surrounding license plate).
8 Higgins v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs. Branch, 13 P.3d 531, 541 n.21 (Or. Ct. App.
2000) (en banc), affd, 72 P.3d 628 (Or. 2003).
'8 Abner Greene characterizes this as ensuring that government is not monopolizing
speech. See Greene, supra note 13, at 27-41. Similarly, Leslie Jacobs thoughtfully describes
the "non-speech-suppressing impact" she would require of legitimate government speech.
Jacobs, supra note 5, at 78-88. Indeed, I agree with much of Professor Jacobs' insightful
discussion, which also seeks to identify the appropriate boundaries between government
and private speech. See id. My analysis most diverges from hers in my greater willingness
to support government's efforts to protect the integrity of its own expression from private
speakers seeking some sort of state imprimatur for their expression. Professor Jacobs
recognizes government's affirmative expressive interests, but is less convinced of the
strength of any negative or dissociative interest. See id. at 66-68. She also more readily
trusts disclaimers to protect any such negative expressive interests. See Leslie Gielow
Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1357, 1398 (2001).
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logos, it does not inhibit individuals and groups from displaying the
very same messages and logos on bumper stickers and license frames
immediately adjacent to the plates themselves. Indeed, the First
Amendment does not permit government to limit this clearly private
speech.90 Regulating the messages conveyed on license plates thus
forecloses only a narrow swath of expressive opportunity, and thus
appears most likely sincerely motivated by government's expressive
interests, rather than an intent to suppress unpopular messages
generally.
C. Will Government Disclaimers Adequately Protect Its Expressive Interests?
Our inquiry should also assess the availability of disclaimers - i.e.,
prominent statements that expressly disavow any government
endorsement of accompanying private speech. If government can
adequately protect the integrity of its expression by disclaiming private
speech, then it should do so. Indeed, government's failure to take
advantage of such opportunities for rebuttal may fuel suspicions that it is
actually motivated by an interest in censoring others, rather than
protecting its own speech."
Disclaimers, however, are ineffective in some circumstances. License
plates, for example, offer no space in which a state may disavow or rebut
'* See, e.g., Erickson v. City of Topeka, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1148 (D. Kan. 2002)
(holding that city violated First Amendment by prohibiting city employee from displaying
Confederate flag on private vehicle parked on city property); Firefighters Ass'n v. Barry,
742 F. Supp. 1182, 1198 (D.D.C. 1990) (deciding that city violated First Amendment by
disciplining firefighters for displaying bumper stickers on their own cars calling their jobs
"jokes"). But see Etheridge v. Hail, 56 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding military
base's ban on bumper stickers and other displays on site that "embarrass or disparage"
commander-in-chief).
Although government regulation of bumper stickers or similar private displays
based on their "offensive" content would likely run afoul of the First Amendment, at least
one state continues to do so despite the considerable constitutional vulnerabilities. See
TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-187 (2003) (prohibiting, inter alia, "patently offensive" bumper
stickers "[tlo avoid distracting other drivers and thereby reducing the likelihood of
accidents").
" Indeed, some commentators argue that disclaimers and disavowals should be the
only means available to the government to protect its own negative expressive interests.
See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1485 ("Where the expressive message is pervasive or
widespread, disavowal may not be perfectly effective. Nevertheless, because the
government's capacity for communicating its position is extensive, it is better to rely on the
government's access to the marketplace of ideas than to permit the government to curtail
the marketplace. Government's escape from unintended attribution, then, would be
limited to disclaimer or disavowal only."); Jacobs, supra note 89, at 1398 (2001) (noting that
most justices "acknowledge that the government can often counteract [mistaken
imprimatur] by means of an effective disclaimer").
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personalized or specialty messages that may be mistakenly attributed to
it. Government may then try to disclaim elsewhere, but this effort is
likely to fail. For example, even if Virginia issues a press release
announcing its neutrality on whether the Confederate flag is a symbol of
heritage or hate, the logo's unrebutted display on the state license plate
may well undermine that position.92
In sum, an assessment of the factors discussed above - the identity of
the "literal" speaker, the purposes sought to be achieved by both
government and private speakers, the availability of other avenues for
private expression, and the effectiveness of disclaimers93 - helps to
' See Jacobs, supra note 89, at 1424 ("Vanity plates do not have the space to explain
whether or not the speaker intended to deliver a message of ethnic hate, ethnic pride, or
neither."); see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 794 n.2
(1995) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that disclaimer may be ineffective if "other indicia of
endorsement outweigh the mitigating effect of the disclaimer, or where the disclaimer itself
does not sufficiently disclaim government support.") (citations omitted); Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 806 n.13 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that disclaimers may not dispel implied government endorsement of religious
displays where display is considerably more visible than government's disclaimer).
" Some courts have also looked to whether a governmental speaker has consistently
asserted editorial control over certain speech in assessing its claim that it seeks only to
protect its own expression from distortion or mistaken attribution. See Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r, Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618-19 (4th Cir. 2002);
Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140-41 (10th Cir. 2001).
For example, in rejecting Virginia's claim that its specialty plate program constituted
the commonwealth's affirmative speech honoring various organizations with a state-
sponsored license plate, the Fourth Circuit found little evidence to suggest that the state
actually screened applicants for merit. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 620-21
(noting that "the record reveals that little, if any, [editorial] control ordinarily is
exercised.").
Similarly, a federal district court found Louisiana's claim that it employs specialty
license plates to communicate official state messages undermined by the absence of
evidence indicating that Louisiana consistently asserted editorial control over plates'
content. See Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699, 717-20 (E.D. La. 2003) (finding
state's argument that it issues "Choose Life" and not "Pro-Choice" specialty license plates
because it chooses to adopt former view as official state message to be undermined by
issuance of Wild Turkey Federation and other specialty plates that do not further state
purposes).
Under this analysis, the more control government asserts over the content of joint
speech, the greater the likelihood that the surviving content will be perceived as carrying
the government's imprimatur. The less selective, the less likely government will be
perceived as endorsing the private elements of its joint speech and the weaker its claims of
concern for its expressive integrity. This suggests, however, that the more speech the
government screens, the more speech it will be allowed to screen - a proposition that
seems inimical to the First Amendment. It also downplays the role of government's
negative expressive interests that may require only occasional or limited editorial action.
For these reasons, I find an assessment of editorial control of limited value to our inquiry.
The better approach, in my view, is to identify those situations in which government
legitimately declines to serve as a dummy delivering what are really the views of a private
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determine whether government's asserted expressive interests are
sufficiently sincere and reasonable to justify its protective actions.
IV. APPLYING THESE PRINCIPLES: SOME HARD CASES
The foregoing discussion offers a framework for sifting through cases,
separating those in which government seeks to protect the integrity of its
own expression from those in which government seeks impermissibly to
stifle others' speech. If we conclude that government is not speaking at
all, then "traditional" First Amendment principles, such as forum
analysis, should apply.94 On the other hand, if we conclude that a public
entity is itself speaking (either solely, or jointly with others), the First
Amendment permits government to control and protect the content of its
speech.
Governmental entities have some options for avoiding constitutional
problems in this context altogether. First, government need not share its
speech at all. For example, a state could decline to offer specialty license
plates and simply issue plates that deliver only its chosen message -
e.g., New Hampshire's state motto, "Choose Life or Die" (so long as,
consistent with Wooley v. Maynard,95 the state does not penalize
individuals who refuse to display the message). Similarly, states could
abandon their personalized license plate programs altogether and return
to randomly generating identifying characters on a background with no
logo or message. That choice, however, would require them to forego a
potentially lucrative revenue source in times of ever-dwindling
06
government resources.
ventriloquist. As discussed supra notes 71-93 and accompanying text, I argue that these
circumstances are best identified by assessing the identity of the literal speaker and the
resulting likelihood that the speech will be attributed to the government, the purposes
underlying government and private participation in the program's expressive
opportunities, and the availability of other avenues for private speakers to air their views
and for government to protect its expressive integrity.
See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Johnny Diaz, You're So Vain with Vanity Plates, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2003,
at City Weekly 1 (noting that Massachusetts vanity plates generate $4.2 million each year in
revenue for state); Amy Hsuan, Drivers Use Plates to Communicate, SYRACUSE POST-
STANDARD, July 20, 2003, at B3 (noting that New York generates about $9 million annually
from custom and personalized plates); Theo Helm, Plate Checks a Ray of Light for Hatteras
Museum, WINTON-SALEM JOURNAL, Aug. 7, 2002, at B1 (noting that North Carolina
collected more than $5 million in 2001 from specialty and vanity license plates); Jack
Kilpatrick, Vanity Plate Law Taking a Well-Deserved Beating, DESERT NEWS, Jan. 22, 2002, at
A07 (stating that vanity tags account for estimated $100 million in easy revenue for states).
But see John Commins, Tennessee Lawmakers Plan Another Look at Specialty License Plates,
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Second, government is free to decline to defend their own expressive
interests. It could accept all applicants to a particular program and
simply disavow any association with any private speech. This choice,
however, requires it to shoulder the risk that it will be mistakenly
perceived as - and wrongly held politically accountable for -
endorsing others' speech.
The tough cases arise where government declines these options,
permitting some, but not other, private input into governmental
expression. Specialty license plate programs - where state initiatives
authorize the issuance of special license plates to members and
supporters of various organizations, groups, or ideas - appear to raise
particularly thorny questions in this regard. So far, lower courts have
generally ruled that state governments violate the First Amendment
when they exclude certain messages or logos from those programs.97 In
so holding, however, these courts too often underestimate the
government's legitimate interest in its expressive integrity.
In Sons of Confederate Veterans, for example, the Fourth Circuit rejected
Virginia's argument that the state would be mistakenly understood as
endorsing the Confederate flag if the logo appeared on state-issued
specialty plates emblazoned with "VIRGINIA" across the top.9 The
court concluded instead that organizations' names and logos constitute
purely private speech.9
An examination of the factors discussed above, however, supports a
different outcome. The court failed to acknowledge the state's role as
"literal speaker" where it requires, owns, manufactures, issues, and is
prominently identified on the plates. The court ignored the likelihood
that reasonable onlookers would thus see the state as, and hold it
accountable for, endorsing the flag.'O° The court also failed to address the
CHATrANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, June 22, 2003, at Al (quoting various public officials
suggesting that political controversy over "Choose Life" license plates supports dropping
specialty license plate program altogether).
' See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 622; Henderson, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 718;
Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Rose, 236 F. Supp. 2d 564,571 (D.S.C. 2002).
" Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 621-22.
w Id. at 621.
" The court may well have been distracted from this inquiry by Virginia's hard-to-
swallow assertion that the specialty plate program was intended as a vehicle for the state's
affirmative expression - i.e., its selection of especially worthy organizations that deserved
to be honored publicly. Virginia maintained that any expressive content on a Virginia
specialty plate is "a statement by the Commonwealth about the group represented on the
plate" - i.e., a way for the state to "honor an organization." See Sons of Confederate
Veterans, 288 F.3d at 616. But as the court observed, "[i]f the General Assembly intends to
speak, it is curious that it requires the guaranteed collection of a designated amount of
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ready availability of alternative avenues for the Sons of Confederate
Veterans to celebrate their organization without the government's
imprimatur (through, for example, bumper stickers and license plate
frames), nor did it consider the limits on the state's ability to disclaim
any endorsement of the Confederate flag logo. Had the court considered
these factors, it should have concluded that license plates are best
understood as the state's own speech, informed in part by input from
private speakers. As Judge Niemeyer forcefully explained in dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc:
I respectfully submit that because Virginia owns the license plates it
issues and rightfully controls what appears on them, it can, as part
of its control, designate their content as its own speech.... I
respectfully submit that it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that
the Commonwealth of Virginia, by manufacturing license plates,
placing its name at the top of those plates, and retaining ownership
of them, is the speaker of any message contained on those plates,
even though the message may have been adopted by the State
pursuant to an application submitted by a licensee.1 01
For a different twist on the expressive interests at stake, consider
Louisiana's position in Henderson v. Stalder.1°2 While Virginia sought to
protect a position of neutrality on the Confederate flag, Louisiana
claimed to be defending its affirmative views from distortion when it
issued, as part of its specialty license plate programs, a "Choose Life"
plate while declining to issue a "Pro-Choice" plate.103 Acknowledging
only the significant private expression at stake, the district court
downplayed the state's role as literal speaker in delivering the
104
message.
Specialty and personalized license plate programs exemplify a
situation where both parties' input is key to the speech: the expression's
money from private persons before its 'speech' is triggered." Id. at 620. Virginia's position
would have been stronger if it had focused on its negative expressive interest in remaining
neutral on the symbolic value of the Confederate flag.
101 Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r, Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 305 F.3d
241, 250-51 (4th Cir. 2002) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see
also id. at 252 (Gregory, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("[Tlhere will
[undeniably] be a perception of government endorsement of the Confederate flag ....
[T]he display of the Confederate flag will be attributed to Virginia.") (emphasis in original).
10 265 F. Supp. 2d 699 (E.D. La. 2003).
10 See id. at 714.
1 See id. at 716-17 ("[T]he Louisiana legislature does not always control the editorial
process and that indeed in actuality, the process is a group effort with the organization
seeking the plate.").
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delivery depends on a message proposed by an individual or group, to
be approved and manufactured by the government and displayed under
the government's name on plates required and owned by the
government1 0 Personalized and specialty license plate programs thus
offer another example of joint speech in which government appears to be
the literal speaker of a message proposed in part by private actors. As
explained above,'06 truly joint speech requires that both parties agree to
the joint expression. Absent such agreement, either party may withhold
its voice, rather than be compelled to join speech with which it does not
want to be associated. Just as the Wooleys could decline to display New
Hampshire's "Live Free or Die" plate on their private vehicle, so too can
Virginia and Louisiana decline to issue state plates displaying messages
with which they disagree.
For this reason, Louisiana should be free to issue only a "Choose Life"
plate without producing plates featuring counter-messages - just as
New Hampshire remains free to issue only "Live Free or Die" and the
District of Columbia only "Taxation Without Representation" license
plates.17 The outcome should be no different if, instead of a single state
message (like "Live Free or Die"), the state agrees to allow individuals
who so desire to select from a number of messages the state chooses to
deliver, even if some or all of those messages are generated after
considering public input.
105 In contrast, Professor Jacobs would characterize license plates as conveying only
private expression, because she sees little opportunity for an identifiable government
message, either affirmative or dissociative, and places relatively little weight on
government concerns about mistaken attribution. See Jacobs, supra note 5, at 98.
" See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
" Of course, as the Supreme Court made clear to New Hampshire, the First
Amendment would not permit Louisiana to compel dissenting individual drivers to
display plates with such messages. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
While I think that government may generally control the content of what is at least
partly its own expression, that power is not limitless. For example, decisions to approve
some partisan license plates but not others (e.g., if Vermont were to reject "BUSH4PREZ"
but not "DEAN4PREZ" plates) may raise legal concerns apart from any First Amendment
problems. Such decisions may violate federal or state laws prohibiting the use of
government facilities for electioneering, raise equal protection concerns, or run afoul of the
Constitution's structural commitment to prevent the entrenchment of the prevailing
political leadership. See e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 732(a) (2000) (prohibiting use of official authority or
influence to affect results of election and prohibiting use of government property or
facilities for partisan activities); ME. STAT. tit. 5, § 7056-A(3)(B) (2002) (barring state
employees from engaging in political activity while using state facilities or services);
Greene, supra note 13, at 37-38.
"0 See Higgins v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs., 13 P.3d 531, 537 n.13 (Or. Ct. App.
2000) ("To forestall any misunderstanding, we emphasize that our decision addresses only
the narrow situation presented in this case in which private individuals or entities are
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In other words, government may announce: "We'll print up some
license plates that we like and you can buy and display them if you like
them too. Some messages may even be based on your suggestions."
Under this view, a government may decide to adopt either "Choose Life"
or "Pro-Choice" - or both or neither - as its official state message and
issue license plates displaying such messages to those willing to display
them. Similarly, a government could choose to display the Confederate
flag - or not - on its plates or over its capitol dome. Of course,
government should be held politically accountable for such decisions
about the content of its own expression, but those choices are not
constrained by the First Amendment.1
Reconsider another scenario. In Cuffley v. Mickes, the Eighth Circuit
held unconstitutional Missouri's rejection of the Klan's application to
participate in the state Adopt-A-Highway roadside clean-up program
that would trigger acknowledgment of the Klan's services in a state
highway sign.' Perhaps because Missouri did not appear to raise its
own expressive interests at the beginning stages of the litigation, the
court instead decided the case on unconstitutional conditions grounds,
and did not consider whether the signs' views were attributable to the
state, the Klan, or both."'
given the opportunity to recommend to the state what it will communicate or to select any
messages chosen by the state for its communication. Our resolution of that issue does not
necessarily control the result in all situations in which the state and others are jointly
involved in communication.") (emphasis in original), afrd, 335 Or. 481 (2003). Holding that
vanity license plates do not lose their governmental character simply because their content
may be informed or influenced by private input, the Oregon Court of Appeals offered the
following analogy: "Assume that the state solicits the submission of communicative
material to be placed in display cases at the State Capitol, with detailed standards for the
content of the submissions and a commission to screen the submissions for compliance
with the standards." Id. at 537.
1 See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r, Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288
F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[Wlhere the government itself is responsible, and therefore
accountable, for the message that its speech sends, the danger ordinarily involved in
governmental viewpoint-based choices is not present."); Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (identifying "traditional political controls" as appropriate vehicle for
"ensur[ing] responsible government action").
"10 Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 707 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 903 (2001).
.. Applying unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the panel concluded that Missouri
penalized the Klan (by excluding it from the Adopt-a-Highway Program) because the Klan
refused to forsake its constitutionally protected freedom of association. Cuffley, 208 F.3d at
707-09. Not only does unconstitutional conditions analysis fail to consider the parties'
competing expressive interests, but, as the subject of significant criticism, the "doctrine
itself has all but disappeared from Supreme Court's arsenal." See Schauer, supra note 47, at
102-03 (discussing "decreasingly useful doctrine of unconstitutional conditions" and noting
that Court's most recent government speech cases have not invoked such analysis); see also
Steven D. Hinckley, Your Money or Your Speech: The Children's Internet Protection Act and the
University of California, Davis
A different analysis, and outcome, would have been appropriate had
the state vigorously defended its action on the grounds that it sought to
prevent its own speech from being commandeered by the Klan. Because
the government manufactures, erects, owns, and maintains the signs, the
state can be seen as the literal speaker, and thus endorser, of the signs'
content. Indeed, the Adopt-A-Highway program was intended to
encourage volunteer participation by offering government recognition of
the volunteers' efforts in a highway sign. In this manner, the Missouri
Highway Department's concerns parallel those of its public radio station.
It wishes to exercise its own expressive choices about from whom to
accept contributions (whether of effort or cash) and whom it will
publicly acknowledge. In both situations, the Klan appears to seek some
sort of government imprimatur for its action.
The Klan, however, remains free to seek publicity for its good
citizenship in other ways that do not suggest the state's blessing.
Whether equally attractive alternative avenues for expression remain
available, of course, depends on how broadly or narrowly one defines
the message and the market at issue." 3 Consider, for example, what the
Klan seeks to express - and to whom - through a state highway sign's
acknowledgment of the Klan's roadside clean-up efforts. If we define
the Klan's message narrowly as "advertis[ing] good citizenship of this
particular kind to the specific audience of motor vehicle operations
driving on the specific highway,"' 14 then the state's rejection of the Klan
has completely shut down that particular expression. 5 If, on the other
hand, we understand the Klan as motivated by the desire to persuade
the public of its good citizenship, then surely that message can be
effectively conveyed by the Klan's visible engagement in any number of
Congressional Assault on the First Amendment in Public Libraries, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1025, 1070,
1073 (2002) (criticizing Supreme Court's unconstitutional conditions analysis as result-
oriented, often drawing "inexplicably fine distinctions": "In cases where the Court
concludes that funding conditions are so coercive that they leave recipients with no choice
but to forego constitutionally protected activity, the Court is able to declare the condition to
be a penalty and invoke the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to reject it .... In
contrast, when the Court finds that a funding condition merely structures a program to
support federally encouraged activities without precluding recipients' exercise of
constitutionally protected activity on their own time and with their own money, the Court
can uphold the challenged conditions as a mere nonsubsidy.").
1.2 See Jacobs, supra note 5, at 93 (concluding that highway signs constitute government
speech).
1,3 See Greene, supra note 13, at 29.
"4 Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1491.
IS See Jacobs, supra note 5, at 80 (emphasizing that government action must not
preclude opportunities for ventilation of private expression).
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other charitable and volunteer activities. First Amendment values are
not frustrated by government efforts to protect its expression that
deprive a private speaker of only the opportunity to speak in a setting
that mistakenly conveys the government's endorsement of his or her
speech, while leaving the speaker free to deliver the same message
elsewhere.
Of course there are circumstances where government claims to its own
expressive interests fail to pass constitutional muster. Could a city refuse
to sell the Klan subway advertising to protect its own expressive
integrity?1 6  Probably not. Unlike government educators and
broadcasters, transit agencies are not the "literal" speakers of advertising
copy; instead, they allow private copy to be posted on government
property. Moreover, because transit agencies are primarily in the
business of moving people rather than communicating with them,
advertising content is considerably less likely to be mistakenly attributed
to the transit agencies. Private speakers seeking to purchase advertising
space are motivated chiefly by an interest in capturing not the
government's endorsement, but the attention of as many onlookers as
possible in a busy location. Furthermore, the available space is much
greater, and thus more conducive to disclaimers and rebuttals. For these
reasons, transit agencies and similar government entities that offer
advertising space have considerably weaker claims to their own
expressive interests.1 1 7 Such cases are more appropriately decided under.
"6 Governments have rarely so defended transit advertising decisions, which are
usually grounded in some sort of forum analysis. See, e.g., Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp., 148 F.3d 242, 249 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that government did not
seek to justify restrictions on transit advertising based on its own expressive interest and
conceded appropriateness of applying some type of forum analysis), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1068 (1999); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Dep't of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144, 1152-53 (7th Cir.
1995) (same). The resulting forum analysis has generated mixed results. See Irene Segal
Ayers, What Rudy Hasn't Taken Credit For: First Amendment Limits on Regulation of
Advertising on Government Property, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 607, 608 (2000) (discussing split in
authority addressing government efforts to regulate transit advertising).
117 The court in Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of University of Missouri
distinguished underwriting acknowledgments from paid advertisements, arguing that the
public understands that advertisements do not necessarily reflect the endorsement of their
publisher, while underwriting acknowledgments trigger different public perceptions.
Knights of the Ku Kiux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1095-96 (8th Cir.
2000). Whether listeners attribute advertisements' content to their publishers is the topic of
some disagreement. Compare Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 321 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("'The endorsement of an opinion expressed in an advertisement
on a motor coach is no more attributable to the transit district than the view of a speaker in
a public park is to the city administrator or the tenets of an organization using school
property for meetings is to the local school board.' The city has introduced no evidence
demonstrating that its rapid transit passengers would naively think otherwise.") (quoting
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forum analysis.
Consider another case in which government's expressive interests fall
short. Private plaintiffs who sought to hang anti-war banners challenged
California's policy of prohibiting displays on state highway overpasses
except those featuring the American flag. California argued that this
policy was constitutionally permissible because it reflected its own
expressive choice to honor the flag."8 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
state's expressive claim, emphasizing that "the government neither hung
the flag itself nor delegated that authority nor funded the project -
private citizens spontaneously expressed their message of patriotism by
hanging their flags."11 9 A review of the factors discussed above confirms
this result. California was not in any way the literal speaker. Because
the Transportation Department's purpose is highway safety and
maintenance, rather than communication, it was especially unlikely to be
understood as endorsing displays spontaneously draped on public
property. In addition, the private speakers did not appear to seek any
state imprimatur for their message - they sought simply to have their
banner viewed by as many people as possible. The state's expressive
interests, if any, certainly did not require protection from mistaken
attribution. Any other government interests in regulating overpass
displays (e.g., highway safety) could be addressed under forum analysis.
Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 61 (1967)), and Planned
Parenthood, Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 841 n.14 (9th Cir. 1991) (Norris, J.,
dissenting) ("The idea that readers of the district's publications will assume that a paid
advertisement bears the imprimatur of the school district is preposterous. Readers are no
more likely to assume that Planned Parenthood's ad bears the district's imprimatur than
ads from political candidates, casinos, churches, or lounges and bars."), with Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 801 n.6 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A
commercial message displayed on a billboard, for example, usually will not be taken to
represent the views of the billboard's owner because every reasonable observer is aware
that billboards are rented as advertising space. On the other hand, the observer may
reasonably infer that the owner of the billboard is not inalterably opposed to the message
presented thereon; for the owner has the right to exclude messages with which he
disagrees, and he might be expected to exercise that right if his disagreement is sufficiently
profound."). The New York Times and other advertisers seem to indicate some concern that
advertisements will be imputed to the publisher. See New York Times Guidelines on
Advertising Acceptability, (Sept. 3, 2003), available at www.nytimes.com/
adinfo/rateaccept.html ("[T]he confidence of readers in a news website, its news,
editorial, and advertising, depends on its integrity.... Generally speaking, any advertising
that may cause financial loss or loss of the readers' confidence in respectable advertising
and ethical business practices is unacceptable.").





Without question, government should be held politically accountable
for the views it chooses to espouse. A fair corollary of this principle,
however, would enable government to ensure that it is held responsible
only for its own speech, and not that of others. The First Amendment
should thus be understood to permit government to refuse to utter
speech with which it does not want to be associated, mirroring private
speakers' right to be free from governments' efforts to compel speech
with which they disagree. Cases that appear to involve elements of both
government and private speech are especially challenging given current
constitutional doctrine that appears to demand a choice between one or
the other. Too often, courts fail or refuse to- acknowledge that
government itself is speaking in a particular context, and thus has an
interest in protecting the integrity of its own expression. Although there
may be no simple solution to these challenges, denying that government
and private entities sometimes speak jointly generates confusing and
inconsistent results.
The handful of courts that have acknowledged even the possibility of
joint government/private speech have offered little guidance on the
standards for evaluating government action in this context. Even those
courts that acknowledge the legitimacy of government's interest in
protecting its own expressive integrity too often muddy the waters by
claiming to apply some sort of forum doctrine.
The better framework is to understand these not as forum cases, but
situations in which government itself is speaking - either on its own or
jointly with a private speaker - and is thus free to protect the integrity
of its own expression by refusing to utter speech with which it disagrees.
For these reasons, we should think more carefully about the
circumstances under which private speech may be mistakenly
understood as that of the government. Particularly helpful factors in
assessing competing private and governmental claims to the same
expression include the identity of the literal speaker, the reasons for
governmental and private participation in the program at issue, the
availability of alternative avenues for ventilating the private expression,
and the effectiveness of government disclaimers or rebuttals.
While government should have the latitude to protect what is truly its
own speech from being appropriated by others, we still need to ensure
that its actions do not frustrate First Amendment values. Our
commitment to free speech requires that we remain skeptical of
government's assertions unless and until it can persuade us that its
efforts are not a pretext for squelching unpopular or inconvenient
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private speech. I have suggested that government can do so by
demonstrating that it is itself speaking and that it reasonably fears that,
absent preventive action, its speech will be mistakenly perceived to
endorse others' expression.
